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3y: Reginald Herbold Green
On a cloth untrue
With a tvisted cue
And elliptical billiard balls...
-Gilbert and Sullivan
Words mean what I say 
They mean...
-Red Queen (Lewis Carroll)
And never, never was seen again,
For the Snark was a boojum you see...
-’’Hunting the Snark" (Lewis Carroll)
What Are We Talking About?
Presumably we are talking about three clusters of things and concepts: 
social sciences; their application; economic planning. Social sciences 
in this context can be seen as a body of knowledge and also as a way 
(or rather set of ways) of looking at, analyzing, struggling with 
selected aspects of reality.
Application of social sciences can mean three quite different 
things. It can mean "applied social science" in the academy's terminology 
teaching about specific applications or cases rather than theory and/or 
carrying out applied research on particular instances or cases with or 
without any direct intent that the results will be used other than m
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the extension of knowledge. Those are legitimate meanings of applied, 
but not the ones which usually occur to men of affairs. Applied in 
plazas usually means directed to mobilizing for some political or 
political economic cause, goal or leader. This is not the sense 
of applied that usually comes first into an academic's mind but it is 
an important and a valid one. True it is subject to abuse but so too are 
all applications. Finally - and this is probably the sense of applied 
foremost in discussions of the applied role of social sciences - is 
application by holders or agents of power. Application in this sense 
is not homogenous - advising a Prime Minister on strategy; elucidating 
principles for a Price Commissioner; suggesting operating rules of thumb 
for a Corporate Manager; working out the effective incidence of sales 
tax for a Revenue Commissioner are all applied and applied within the 
corridors of power but neither the techniques useful, the form of 
presentation required, nor the balance between normative and value - 
neutral elements are uniform.
How Can We Organize Our Investigation and Reflection?
Planning is about organizing scarce resources so as to reach targeted 
progress ever a given time toward a set of previously defined goals 
which are external to the planning process itself and usually very 
much normative. Hopefully a paner about it can benefit from making 
use of a planning format since time, space and attention spans are scarce 
resources. Planning is also about complexity and balancing (or synthesizing 
or trading off) since objectives are usually partly joint products, 
tartly complementary, partly alternative and partly contradictory.
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That unfortunately is very much the case with short papers on long, 
complex topics.
It is worth a passing comment that handling problems with multiple, 
less than complementary objectives appears to create more problems for 
academic social scientists than for men of affairs - whether politicians, 
managers or civil servants. The desire to set problems up as exercises 
in maximization of one output is remarkably deeprooted in the social 
sciences and, while it has its uses as an introductory pedagogical 
technique, is remarkably ill attuned to the needs of serious analysis 
or application. Very few "real” contexts can be represented and very 
few real "problems" handled within the one output maximization paradigm. 
Worse, users of that model have a tendency to condemn reality when it 
does not correspond to the model and to argue that any politician or 
manager pursuing multiple, less than congruent goals must be making 
an elementary mistake in defining his objectives. Politicians and 
managers (and other real people for that matter) are perfectly well 
aware that they normally pursue more than one goal and that maximum 
progress toward one ignoring the others is not (or rarely) what they 
wish to achieve. They view criticism of this contextual reality as 
betraying either "academicism" in the perjorative sense or a lack of 
common sense; the applied advice they wish from social scientists on the 
problem of multiple, partly conflicting goals, is how to handle 
balance - synthesis - trade off more effectively - not how to do away 
with most of the goals. In general social scientists have been less 
than forthcoming in meeting this need.
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The consideration of applied social science and development planning 
needs to he prefaced with a consideration of social science and 
development. This is true partly because a number of the issues are 
not particular to planning but relate to social science/policy inter- 
' actions in general and partly because for at least a decade there has 
been a crisis within the academic social sciences as to how to view 
development. The 19^-5-70 paradigm is cuite clearly moribund, but no 
successor has emerged nor even a coherent struggle among rival contenders.
Social Science and Development
The crisis in social science thinking about development can be
termed the "death of a paradigm". Over 19^5-1970 there was a dominant
way of locking at and thinking about development within the social
sciences. Its key words were growth and modernization. Its apparent
view of the dynamics of change was that the history of the industrialized
economies was to be repeated in the outlanas not as tragedy nor as
farce but as triumphal march. This is, of course, to parody what
was (and is) in many respects a sophisticated and nuanced body of 
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thought. However, growth, modernization and universalization of 
history by successful copying were red threads running through the 
analysis and prescription. The paradigm - rather intriguingly - did 
have claims to universal acceptance. The Northwest and Northeast 
variants had far more in common than divided them, and even the 
main body of Southern thought until the 1960's (e.g. Mahalanobis, 
Prebisch) was at most in a different key around the same motifs.
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That paradigm is moribund. It is not dead in that a majority of 
academic practitioners still use it - though not a majority of those 
attempting original research - and that the majority of applied social 
science advice given to men of affairs still flows from it. However, 
it lacks conviction by its proponents (with the possible exception 
of Soviet social scientists who seem to be the last of the growth men) 
and credibility to a growing majority of its auditors. Its death came 
not so much from intellectual breakthroughs as from the realization 
that change over 19^5-70 (and more especially since) did not correspond 
very closely with what the social science analysis "predicted" and 
was in a number of critical ways highly unsatisfactory. At the centre 
this realization in the context of social science analysis-description- 
prescription about development interacts with much greater post-1960 
questioning of the model-! s desirability there; a "development" which 
necessarily raises «questions about its suitability as a universal 
export commodity.
To imply that the "development crisis" is a crisis of academics 
would, hopefully needless to say, be absurd. The direction of causation 
is quite the other way. However, the crisis as perceived by political 
decision takers and managers (and by ordinary participant in victims 
of the development and/or underdevelopment processes) is rather different 
irom the academic perception. On the one hand, a significant number of 
political leaders and managers never accepted the paradigm or recanted 
it earlier. On the other, a larger number still find certain 
aspeccs of it quite consonant with their class, context or national 
— -eresos and cling to it with rather more tenacity and faith than its
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original academic proponents.
Social Scientists, Social Science and Social Reality
Two other clusters of issues or problems also are broader than 
economic planning (or indeed development) but apply to it. The 
first is perhaps most handily termed communications. Communications 
within a country among academicians, managers, political decision 
takers and the general public are always problematic and nowhere more
vso than m  countries to which applied social science as a separate body 
of thought pursued by a separate priesthood of specialists is quite new. 
Cross-country communications pose additional problems. While the most 
commonly considered one is Worth-South because of historic patterns 
of domination and reaction to it, South-Worth, South-South, Wortheast- 
Northwest, Wortheast-Northeast and Worthwest-Worthwest communications 
also raise issues additional to those within individual countries .
Finally, a number of conceptual issues are perhaps best seen as intra­
academy communications problems.
The uses (or abuses) of the social sciences as analytical guides 
to and tools for use in social action are a highly controversial and «
a very comnlex tonical cluster in themselves. What is striking is the 
very different degree to which the social science disciplines are applied 
and the almost equally divergent degree of "leadership” (as opposed 
to instrumentality) they enjoy (or are burdened with) in applied fields.
Economics is widely applied (in season and out) and has considerable 
influence as an organizing principle or body of principles. Law 
is widely used but almost totally functionally, with very little general
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intellectual influence. Sociology and psychology are not commonly 
applied functionally nor generally notable for intellectual impact on 
social and political action. Beyond these differences among social sciences 
is the broader point that academic, managerial and political (including, 
for this purpose, "ordinary" human beings as veil as decision takers) 
perceptions of the applied role of the social sciences either as it is 
or as it ought to be differ significantly.
Economic Planning: Definition and Content
"Economic Planning" is not an entirely satisfactory category 
because its use begs several questions. National planning is not 
in practice purely economic even if one substitutes political economy 
for "economic science”. Nor is it by any means evident that this is 
a weakness; on balance it is arguable that most national planning 
is too economistic rather than too preoccupied with non-eccnomic concerns. 
From a social science point of view the use of the term "economic 
planning" implies the appropriateness of a hierarchy with economics 
at the centre and on top and other disciplines called on by the economists 
to make functional contributions to a whole both intellectually and 
functionally dominated by economics. Whatever else that approach may 
be, it is not conducive to fruitful involvement of other disciplines in 
planning !
Therefore, hereafter planning - unmodified - will be substituted 
for "economic planning." An alternative formulation would be national 
development planning. A.part from prelixity, that set of adjectives 
--~s .he disadvantage of placing too much weight on macro and centralized 
aspects and too little on micro (enterprise) and decentralized ones
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and of conjuring up slightly unreal visions of planning in a closed 
-economy. (One of the drawbacks of economics is that it has a greater 
tendency than most social sciences to conjure up closed units not open 
to outside influences for pedagogical or exploratory purposes and 
then neglects to relax the artificial constraints when turning to 
articulated analysis or application!)
A central issue in respect to planning is one of definition.
Can planning be equated with collecting data and analysis for, and organizing 
the writing of, plans? It is only slightly 'unfair to suggest this as 
the academic social science definition and one which has gained 
considerable political decision-taker and manager acceptance (possibly 
to encapsulate or neutralize the academicians at least as often as to 
give a central role to analysis and authorship!) However, it is by no 
means a self evidently valid or operational definition. To take a 
somewhat parallel case, budgeting is not normally defined as the writing 
of budgets. The budgetary process is usually perceived as including 
the operation, revision and assessment stages as well as the analytical 
and formulative ones. That perception is common to social scientists 
specializing in public finance and is clearly quite contradictory to 
the standard academic view as to what constitutes planning. The 
contradiction is only made starker by the fact that the budgetary process 
is a major organizing focus and operational nexus of planning 'under 
any technique other than pure material balances planning backed by 
rationing and directives.
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Context necessarily is at least partly consequential on definition.
If planning stops with the publication of a plan, one set of techniques 
is appropriate; if like budgeting is is a continuing process with plans 
(like budgets) recurrent stages in (rather than the whole of) the process, 
rather more techniques are critical. Further there is need to consider 
the possibility that quite different techniques are appropriate for 
different uses and users.
It is arguable that the most disastrous contributions of social 
science to planning flow from reductionist misapplication of the Harrod- 
Domar-F'eldman models linking fixed investment, growth and employment.
In practice their influence has been economistic, fixed investment 
centered (to the exclusion of working capital), contextually abstracted 
and indifferent to political,economic - let alone social or political - 
realities and goals. But the Harrod-Dcmar strands were and are useful 
analytical and modeling tools for employment and growth planning in 
industrial capitalist economies so long as they are not regarded as 
complete or adequate by themselves. Similarly, the F'eldman model 
was a relevant tool for gaining insights into the parameters of 
central resource allocation within a closed socialist economy starting 
from initial low levels of productivity/productive forces.
Quite possibly pedagogy, exploration, analysis and operations 
require divergent types of models and of techniques for manipulating 
them. A common thread is the need to remember that a model - by definition ~ 
is a simplified abstraction from reality and can produce "results" 
no cetver than the initial selection of key variables (issues, forces)
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to be studied and the initial contextual parameters set out as a 
substitute for actually analyzing other factors.
Similarly, different users require rather different tools in 
respect to planning (or most other areas of theoretical or applied 
social science). A teacher, a researcher, a political actor, a manager, 
a civil servant, an "ordinary" participant do not have the same concerns 
with, the same needs from, nor the same interactions in planning.
It would, therefore, be somewhat surprising if the same content 
was appropriate to all.
Steps Forward
Consideration of steps forward will be limited to two clusters: 
intra-academic and joint academic/operational actor. This is not 
a choice based on any particular view of relative importance but on the 
primary aim and audience of this paper.
The identification of steps forward should flow from examination 
of where we are, how we arrived there and what our major present 
discontents may be. Therefore, unlike the other sections of the paper 
its "action conclusion" will not be summarized or forelighted at this 
point.
II.
The Lost Paradigm
The growth and modernization paradigm of 19^5-70 was a substantial
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achievement, "both intellectually and in terms of practical impact.
Since the early classical economists and the late mercantilism of 
Liszt and Hamilton, economics had not by and large concerned itself 
much with what we now term development nor with working out particular 
applications of "main economy" theory for "backward" territories.
One need only look at the "colonial" economics of the 1930s or the 
occasional allusions to colonies and peripheries in main line work to 
see how different the position is today from what it was in the 19k0s.
Then when Hans Singer went to join the UN’s fledgling economic secretariat, 
Joseph Schumpeter could only say in amazement "But I thought you 
were an economist...".
The impact has not been purely - nor even primarily - academic. 
Development economics is still a rather lower middle class sub-discipline 
from the point of view of its own profession and lacks the rigeur 
and elegance of more theoretical and econometric branches. The intellectual 
impact is rather more of the type Keynes termed voices in the air to 
which politicians (and, in this case, managers and bureaucrats) listen; 
but in the case of development economics the scribblers have not been 
defunct but very much alive, so short has been the period from pen to 
practical influence (or at least cooptation into apparent influence), 
equally the impact has gone beyond intellectual - organizational 
structures have been altered, certain priorities have been set, finance 
and personnel have been raised and allocated in not inconsiderable sums, 
at least partly on the basis of the paradigm. True, 5-Year Plans go back
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to the Gold Coast of the 1920’s (7-Year Plan in that case) and the
Belgian Congo of the 1930's, as well as to the USSR, but it is the
development paradigm of the social scientists which made them in form
(and occasionally in substance)a universal feature of the Third
World. True, much "planning" is a facade carefully crafted to attract
aid or investment, but because both recipient and transferor states feel
a need (for whatever reason) to play this game, the paradigm does to
a degree influence policies and resource allocations even if not
necessarily as its authors suppose'd nor necessarily for the good 
1/(however defined).
This is not the place to discuss the growth and modernization 
model in detail. Suffice to say that its skeletal structure was 
the Harrod-Domar-F ’eldman ■ but that significant additions were
made to take account-of structural differences and elements (e.g. 
education somewhat artifactually transformed into "human investment” 
and made to seem as analagous to standard fixed investment as possible). 
However, these structural modifications and additions were all formulated 
on the basis that development meant becoming like the already industrialized 
economies - a characteristic as true of the periphery writers as one of 
those based in the Northwest or Northeast and of the Marxian as of 
the bourgeois economists.
Clearly the history in the paradigm was either symbolic (like 
Locke’s "covenant" or Marx/Engel’s history of pre-capitalist modes of 
production) or abstracted to the point of reductionism. Few serious 
historians have ever viewed knowing history as a means to causing
it to repeat itself as a series of brilliant triumphant marches. Nor 
was the apparent universalism of the paradigm quite what it seemed. 
Development was to become universal, but by the process of homogenizing 
the periphery into a copy of the industrial societies of a few decades 
before (and approach with deep roots in the Marxian tradition). Thus 
the paradigm was open to any country or any intellectual to join - 
but at the price of accepting cultural, intellectual and technical 
deprovincialization (for the proponents) or neo-colonialism (for the 
opponents) . Even the potentially independent "provincial" schools of 
thought came to be incorporated as special cases (e.g. Prebisch and 
ECLA) or misread as neo-classical variation on a theme (e.g. Myint 
and the Rangoon School, albeit in the end Myint seems to have some 
to misinterpret his earlier work in the same way). The final irony 
was that apparent root and branch critics - e.g., many of the "develop­
ment of underdevelopment" and the "unequal exchange" groups - actually 
wrote not on alternatives to the paradigm but on what factors blocked 
its operation and how these might be removed!
The development paradigm was ultimately the intellectual 
world that Europe (and North America) made; the intellectual successor 
to the high noon of colonialism and, its harsher critics might (perhaps 
slightly unfairly) suggest, the intellectual justification for the 
high noon of neo-colonialism.
Death of A Paradigm
The paradigm did not die (or sink into a terminal coma) because 
bf intellectual incoherence or inconsistency. Few naradigms do. Indeed
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either the Marxian or the bourgois variant of the paradigm (and certainly 
the ECLA variant of the late 1950s and early 1960s) are more elegant, less 
inconsistent and more logically complete than any alternatives existing 
then or now. The difficulty is that the world they describe appears to 
diverge in significant respects from the real world in which real people 
live so that, like Ptolenjaic astronomy, they have fallen into desperate 
and increasingly unsatisfactory efforts to explain why reality is unreal 
and the paradigms are somehow better ideal type constructs (whether in 
the Weberian or the Platonic sense) than those partial models-theories 
which do have recognizeable objective corellatives.
The main "problems" of the paradigm modifiers and defenders have been:
a. growth often did not happen even when most of the supposed 
preconditions were met (or it became evident on examination 
that the model's preconditions could never be met for the 
economy in question);
o. when growth aid occur, development in any meaningful sense 
did not by any means always follow, e.g., Liberia certainly 
grew over 19^5-65, but even the most economistic of observers 
could hardly suppose it was becoming more like a modern 
industrial economy or society;
c. when development did occur, the patterns did not seem to
fit the model and/or had a singular number of "unsatisfactory 
elements", e.g., South Korea (and for that matter North Korea) 
have grown and developed in ways which up to a point are 
prize cases for the paradigm, but many aspects of their 
development (as with Japan before them) are very distinctively 
different from industrial Eurone (West or East) and show 
little sign of becoming less so; e.g., Brazil's growth and
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development have been characterized by a sharpness of class 
division, regional inequality and naked social injustice, 
which (whatever its parallels in 19th Century capitalism) 
simply are not viewed as acceptable or viable by centre 
capitalist intellectuals and give rise to doubts even by 
the intellectual and managerial architects of the growth 
processes in question;
d. there has been a loss of faith in growth and modernization 
at the centre. The manifestations vary (from 1963 through 
Green Parties to the New Right, and from alternative life 
styles to decentralized people's participation to odd variants 
of neo-Puritan authoritianism masquerading as mass liberation) 
and are more evident in the Northwest than in the Northeast.
What is common is a much more nuanced and less optimistic 
view of the world than was common about 1950 and much greater 
doubt that bigger and better is the be-all and end-all of 
progress. Needless to say, it is possible to keep an intellectual 
model for export after loosing faith in it at home (especially 
if it is a catch up model!), but there are rather serious 
logical and personal difficulties in doing so.
Political Will: Cop Out or Confusion?
A method of defending the paradigm requires special mention. This 
is the statement (or exhortation) that the problem is absence of political 
will. It is rarely clear exactly what this is supposed to mean other 
zhan that politicians are not acting as the author believes they logically 
should in their own interests, as the model says they will, or as the 
author wishes they would.
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The attack - while occasionally convincing - in general seems singularly 
ill considered. Political decision takers do not by and large lack the will to 
do things. What they do lack is a will to behave as the paradigm says 
they ought to do. That suggests the appropriate response to be a re­
examination of what their perceived goals are and how their political 
will relates to them. Only if such a reexamination show that they are not 
acting in their own medium-term interests (as they perceive those interests), 
is the criticism as put valid and, even then, political will is hardly 
the most accurate term.
If the criticism means that the social scientists wish the political 
decision takers' goals and means to achieving them were different, that 
is a different criticism. It may be a perfectly valid one but is hardly 
best put by saying that the paradigm represents reality and the way political 
decision takers, coalitions and classes behave represents a set of aberrations 
from reality! It is perfectly proper for a social scientist to set out 
to alter reality by educating-converting-mobilizing individuals, institutions 
or classes, but it is counterproductive to start by asserting that the 
desired altered dynamic is present reality as opposed to a potentially 
attainable and preferable reality.
Perhaps, however, "absence of political will" really represents a 
despairing code term for social scientists' recognition that there is no 
operational statetheory. (Economists blame this on political scientists, who 
in turn argue it results from the hegemony of economists, while sociologists 
rather cloudily - even if probably justly - blame both of the other dis­
ciplines. Presumably psychologists nave something to say about all their 
colleagues, and historians can find similar examples in the intellectual 
history of deteriorating world views!) The development paradigm was
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an extreme example of this. Its bourgois variants really do assume a 
harmony of all significant sub-class interests - a characteristic which 
becomes even more noted in applied variants promoted oy international 
organizations such as the World Bank. The Marxian variants certainly 
incorporate the term "class struggle", but neither their "creative capitalism 
before the revolution" nor their "socialist construction after the revolution" 
applied versions actually include it in any integral fashion. (Chinese social 
science has been an exception, but has not been part of the paradigm nor 
widely accessible to other social scientists, managers or political decision 
takers.)
A Heritage of Fragmentation
To operate at a time when a paradigm that has endured for 25 years 
as a dynamic force has undergone a decade of ’uncertainty sinking into 
disintegration poses a number of very real intellectual, problems.
1. "Frontier thinking" and discourse are more than usually 
fragmented and the relationships among different pieces are 
more than usually problematic because there are no (or very 
few) generally accepted, integrating principles to which 
they related and around which they circle.
2. The gap between frontier thinking and the bulk of research 
(which lags it by perhaps a decade) is abnormally wide - 
probably more micro research is still being done in terms 
of the old paradigm than in terms of attempts to construct
a new paradigmatic frame or a set of more limited "intermediate 
level theories".
3. Similarly, there is a wide gap between both frontier thinking 
and research and the bulk of teaching (where the lag may
be, on average, two decades). The bulk of teaching and of 
reaching materials are quite inconsistent with the themes
of imaginative development discourse.
U. The gaps within the intellectual social science communities are 
paralleled by gaps between them and the managerial/political 
decision taker/public communities whose exposure has been 
to the paradigm in the days of its ascendancy and who interpret 
academic work in the light of that exposure, even if they 
themselves never fully subscribed to the paradigm.
These gaps lead to very real problems of coherence and convincingness. 
It is true that there may be greater humility among social scientists in 
offering prescriptions (may be-uncertainty can lead to brittle assertiveness 
and intellectual certainty about principles to great tolerance and 
flexibility about secondary issue). However, the "on the one hand, but 
on the other" approach inspires decision takers either to remark sourly 
that it is a happy accident that intellectuals are not ectopi with twenty 
hands or to consider whether amputations might reduce the hands to one! 
Decision takers have no objection to being offerred options or being 
warned that each option has certain risks/"bad" side effects, but they 
detest refusal to give a firm opinion or recommendation. (This may 
explain their relative tolerance of economists who tend to assume that 
when asked a question they should answer it whether they know the answer 
or not, whereas some other social scientists appear to insist on reposing 
the question and answering in such complex and qualified terms as to seem 
to the decision taker to be declining to answer at all.)
A Foison of Fads
The quest for coherence has also given rise to a number of what can 
best be described as intellectual fads. This description is unfair to 
many of their authors who have not claimed proto-paradigmatic status for 
them and are initially flattered, then bewildered, and presently horrified 
when their tentative "intermediate level theories" for special cases are
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"■boomed" into international intellectual fads, transmuted beyond their 
imagination (or desire) and then dropped. Needless to say this "faddery" 
does nothing to enhance decision taker confidence in social science - to 
reorient strategy on a new basis every year is not practicable let alone 
optimal. Three of the clusters of fads are of genuine interest because 
they seem to recur and to have certain aspects of reality within them.
a. the pessimistic "neo-classical/Marxian convergence” models.
The ultra orthodox Marxian strand (e.g. Bill Warren) argues 
that capitalism is still creative and that raw accumulation
on the periphery is the way to progress for the next few decades. 
Other variants (e.g. Dudley Seers) see neo-classical and neo- 
Marxian applied growth/development strategy/policy as converging 
with generally repressive and quasi-stagnationist results 
implying that the Chile of Pinochet and Poland are examples 
of this convergence and its fruits.
b. The optimistic "capitalism unleashed" models which in the Northwesi 
are the export version of Friedmania. However, they are more 
than that. It is possible to argue that the Israeli and Chilean 
variants, while in a sense homegrown, really flow from the
minds of intellectuals who look at a world centered on Chicago 
not on Santiago or Tel Aviv. However, that will not serve 
for the Brazilian variant, which on the one hand is not monetarist 
and on the other really does appear to be indigenous both in 
personnel and in being informed by a weltanschaung centered on 
and looking out from Brazil.
G• The optimistic (or normative) neo-Marxian models variously 
titled "Redistribution with Growth," "Another Development,"
—as^c Human Needs, ' Basic Needs," "Third System," "People's
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Participation," "Just, Participatory, Sustainable Society."
In general these do incorporate struggle integrally - albeit 
the international organization variants (understandably) play 
this down with considerable damage to their coherence. Further 
a majority seem to stem from contributions by Third World or 
First World (rather peripherally Second World) social scientist 
including an abnormally high per cent of intellectuals who 
are also "men of affairs," whose world views do center on 
particular peripheral economies/policies rather than on industrial 
economies/policies or a purely artificial globalism. These 
have been the most influential of the fads, but also the most 
subject to coootation and premature obsolescence from too srreat and
ytoo varied claims being made on their behalf.
A critique of this kind is necessarily unfair. The problem is not 
in the intellectual efforts per se. Many do reveal certain aspects of 
reality, build from real development experiences, and offer clues toward 
constructing at least a body of useable intermediate level theories. The 
problem is the frenetic booming of such tentative beginnings into pseudo 
paradigms - a failure to which social scientists, especially those on 
the borderline between academia and application, have been quite as susceptible 
as have managers and political decision takers. (The plazas have not been 
much involved - these fads have tended to be rather elitist ones which 
have never, or at least not yet, reached translation into the vocabulary 
of ordinary discourse or socio-political mobilization.)
Some Silver linings
That most determinedly optimistic of development social scientists,
Albert 0. Hirschmann, recently remarked that the paradigm was doubtless large_y 
wrong and had made development look too easy, but that this might prove
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to have been one of its greatest uses - had social scientists known how 
difficult the intellectual and practical road was in 19^5, they might 
never have attempted it. Without going to that extreme (and at least 
in terms of the academicians and decision takers of the industrial world 
the reflection has more than a grain of truth), one can see certain 
possibilities arising from the present lack of an accepted, universal 
orthodoxy.
1. The nature of development and of progress is open to serious 
examination and to suggestions that they are contextual rather 
than universal. The straight line (turnpike theorem) view
of progress, which really is a product of the European enlighten­
ment, is somewhat in eclipse and the other views with helix, 
cyclical or zigzag paths much more common outside Europe (and 
indeed in Europe before the philosophes) receive more respectful 
hearings and serious analysis as to their role in decisions 
and their potential for organization and mobilization.
2. Universality is no longer viewed as necessarily attainable
or desirable. There is a renewed realization of the possible virtues 
of provincialism interpreted as grounding in a particular context 
and seeing the world (including the global) from the view of 
that context.
3. As a result, the self confidence and "global acceptability" 
of Third World social scientists has increased significantly.
It is no longer per se a criticism of a social scientist to say 
that his world view is centered on Calcutta or Manila or Port 
of Spain or Mexico City or Cairo or Dar es SalaamJ_l/
J. Last but not least, because the "queen of the social sciences” 
of the old paradigm was economics, both political economy and
some of the other social sciences have been able to reassert 
their contributions' importance, if only by pointing out that 
they are able to demonstrate the weaknesses/contradictions 
in the failed models.
Hearing, Listening, Understanding: Some Issues In Communications
While this section relates in particular to social science/social 
scientists; communications problems in respect to planning, most of the 
points are rather more general. For that matter academy-plaza-corridors 
and intercountry communications problems are by no means limited to the 
social sciences; they affect the natural sciences and (perhaps a fortiori 
the arts too.
Communications issues are partly hearing - much of what the academy, 
the plaza and the corridors say is simply not heard in one or both of 
the other fora. Equally they are partly listening problems - for historic 
reasons each of the fora has come to hold a dim view of the intelligence 
and insightfulness of most actors in the other two and therefore no longer
I t  — ^tries to listen very carefully except to a handful of "exceptions".
Beyond hearing and listening there are real problems of understanding, 
both in the sense of comprehending what is being meant and of achieving 
a great enough degree of empathy to see why it is meant and what it means 
to the speaker. (Neither of these two senses of understanding requires 
agreement - there is a good deal to be said both intellectually and 
practically for understanding one's opponents in both senses!)
However, the most convenient way to cluster communications questions 
is nroblem inter-fora within one country, inter-country, and intra-academy 
Corer’unjeating At Home - Issues of Continuity and Effectiveness
Cases of basic moral/value conflict are excluded here. If any forum's 
main members are convinced that one of the other fora has views ana operan
on principles totally anithetic to their own, any practical cooperation or 
even reasoned discourse relationship is virtually impossible. This is 
particularly true of planning. Social scientists who see Dakar-Pekine 
and Metro-Manila as examples of people clearance and see the basic 
interests of the Senegalese and Philippine political decision takers as 
requiring people clearance can hardly make an input into metropolitan 
planning unless they also agree that people clearance is a legitimate 
means (or end). Nor can the political decision takers be expected to 
welcome advice of participation from social scientists known to hold 
contrary views - quite reasonably they suspect such "cooperation" would,
in practice, resemble obstruction of subversion of the ends and targets
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as well as the means.
Nor is it likely to be useful to discuss in detail questions of 
conscience relating to discoursing with, advising, working with, working 
for institutions and decision takers with whom a social scientist is 
in very fundamental disagreement about major means, targets or goals.
These questions relate to ethics rather than social sciences as normally 
defined and are hardly unique to academicians or social scientists.
Verbally social scientists appear, on balance, too prone to assert un­
willingness to cooperate in a rather purist fashion but, in practice, 
the reverse would appear to be the case if participation in plaza or 
corridors is actually an offer.
However, many problems of communication have little to do with basic 
differences of goals or questions of conscience about proper interrelations!! 
Social scientists' communication with political decision takers, managers 
and the public is marked by discontinuity and ineffectiveness even when 
none 01 the parties desires this nor sees any barriers in principle to 
-ruitiul discourse and collaboration.
Continuity of contact is important. There are too many social 
scientists, too many decision takers, too many managers, too many pub­
lics for each to communicate with each, especially if each exercise must 
begin with a hunt-and-seek phase to locate potentially interested 
auditors. Unfocussed sending of speeches or notes on problems or 
academic papers is no substitute. The recipients (usually correctly) 
do not assume themselves to be a selected or particularly rele­
vant audience and pay little attention - so little that they cannot 
identify the 10% of the cases in which they are a primary target audi­
ence.
If there are regular contacts between individuals and institutions,
some of these problems of absent or purely formal (and unheard) communi­
cation can be overcome. This is particularly true when a substantial 
number of institutions (including enterprises) have planning and re­
search units staffed by persons who have some familiarity with academic 
discourse (and often an intriguing desire for acceptance by and respect 
from the professional intellectual community) and when a signifi­
cant number of political decision takers and mobilization leaders 
also have academic or semi-academic backgrounds. Such situations are 
clearly not -universal, but they are commoner than is usually supposed.
However, while regular contacts on a quasi-personal, quasi- 
institutional basis are a start to communication, some greater degree
of formalization is usually useful when attained. For example, it is
reasonable to suppose that social scientists are concerned with the 
applied problems as perceived by political decision takers and mana­
gers (if only as an input into research and a clue as to sources 
and directions of funds!). It is equally reasonable to suppose 
that many managers and political decision takers are interested 
in hearing comments on approaches, ideas as to new approaches, suggestions
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as to ways and means. The conditions for a variety of meetings to dis­
cuss, with or without formal agendas and papers, exists. The sur­
prising point is how rarely it is exploited effectively. The apparent 
reason is '"business" which may indicate either a lack of selecti­
vity in proposals or a lack of enough basic personal contact to set up 
topics for meetings in a way which appears relevant enough to poten­
tial participants to cause them to give these activities priority.
The same holds true of written materials. There is no particular 
reason that a research report, a journal article, a book, a working 
paper for managers, a brief for a minister, or a set of ideas for a 
mobilization campaign flowing from the same problem, the same goals 
and the same research should be a single piece of written work with 
a uniform vocabulary and presentation. On the contrary. Equally, there 
is no reason to suppose that the same social scientists will always be 
interested in or in a position to respond to the needs of a particular 
manager or minister. Per contra, it would be rather surprising if the 
same institutions, enterprises, officials, managers, politicians were 
to be the most likely readers and users of all of a social scientist’s 
or social science unit's papers (or to use only those from one source). 
Academicians seem, on the whole, to be rather "above" giving serious 
consideration to locating and reaching particular audiences (apart 
from themselves) with a devastating reduction of their effectiveness.
To send fifty research papers a year to the senior official of a 
ministry with no cover notes to suggest their relevance (if any) to him 
or to one of his departments and with no consideration of what vocabu­
lary and style might be accessible to him, is to commit fairly element­
ary errors in psychology, educational methodology and communica­
tions theory. Unfortunately, it seems to be the second most common error.
4.he most common is not to send the papers at all, which is doubtless
a worse failing. The problem on the political decision taker/managerial 
side is somewhat different. Both groups are more used to deciding 
on target audiences and speaking or writing to them. However, both 
are in a majority of cases not very well attuned to directing either 
communications in general or queries to intellectual audiences (a weak­
ness which afflicts some who are themselves serious social scientists). 
As a result, their requests for ideas or assistance are not seen as 
such, and their attempts to indicate practical social science prob­
lems are viewed either as hopelessly superficial or rhetoric with­
out substance. (in some cases that is fair comment, but it is ar­
guably more profitable to respond by attempting to pose deeper ques­
tions and issues of content and at the same time to indicate possi­
ble directions than to ignore or make dismissive noises.)
The most critical form of continuity of communication may be 
individuals pursuing mixed careers - in the academy, the enterprise, 
the office, the smaller and middle-level mobilization fora, the broader 
political decision taking posts. Evidently not everybody can or should 
seek this pattern. However, the results of those who do suggest that 
there is much to be said for its being more common. It certainly can 
improve academy-plaza-corridor communication (including achieving 
heated discourse on real issues and clarifying true differences or am­
biguities). The snag in recent years lies not so much in movement 
from academy to plaza or corridor as back again . . . the successful 
migrants do not return or if they do -it is to academies abroad or to 
international organizations research/intellectual wings.
Effectiveness of communications revolves around similar issues: 
level of discourse, attitudes toward problems and perceptions of how 
they are seen by others, worldviews and time frames. The latter seem 
to create special problems. The academician who explained that a system
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(the Chinese mandarinate) was historically an unimportant failure because 
it was stable for only five hundred years evidently was not operating on 
a view of the short-run which is of much relevance to the practising 
planner! Similarly the "worse is better," "no change at periphery 
until final revolution at center," "present national efforts on periphery 
premature" intellectual should accept that no political decision taker 
or manager can accept his advice since, oojectively, it amounts to going 
out and hanging oneself, trying to make matters worse by identifying 
and promoting the most negative social and economic forces, or mi­
grating to the center to start a revolution there. If the intellectual 
school of thought is correct, it is nonetheless not one addressed in any 
meaningful way to Third World decision takers, especially as its own 
logic makes detailed empirical research in particular Third World con­
texts a waste of time ("numbers are inherently bourgeois" is_ a less 
obscurantist dogma than it may appear if one accepts the underlying 
premises).
Inter-Country Tensions in Communications
Normally what is meant by a heading of this type is South reactions 
to North social scientists (originally Northwest but now Northeast 
as well). Such discussions tend to include three elements: differences
on ideas and outlooks, problems relating to particular individuals, and 
"intellectual imperialism."
Differences on ideas or outlooks are not inherently different 
because the social scientist (or on occasion the manager) is a for­
eigner. They may appear to be, but more because deportation on the one 
hand and departure on the other are easier solutions in the cases of 
expatriates, or because expatriate views are seen as more likely to 
acquire (foreign?) practical backing than because the communications/ 
discourse issues are themselves unique. Admittedly an outsider is
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likely to make more errors because of background ignorance and, if 
these are combined with brashness, will set auditors' teeth on edge - 
but that is sometimes equally true of young citizen social scientists.
Personal approaches and habits do seem to constitute a real differenc 
and one which creates problems. A substantial number of foreign soc­
ial scientists are not very much concerned with the countries or peonies 
they study - their peer groups and, potentially, rewarders are else­
where. As a result, they use scarce time, research facilities, coopera­
tion and return nothing at ail (not even copies of erudite articles 
in unreadable formats). In extreme cases they do not even inter­
act with local social scientists, except as sources of low-cost infor­
mation and semi-skilled labor. Further, they can be extremely thought­
less. Two examples may help illustrate. One researcher sent a fifty- 
paged, mimeod questionnaire on regional production and accounts data 
to thirty Third World Ministers of Finance with a mimeod cover letter 
demanding that they answer promptly! An academician hired as a con­
sultant took his terms of reference (citizen written) outlining the or­
ganizational problems he was to tackle and articulated it into a 
research project from which he produced several academic articles and 
secured an international organization post. What he did not do was 
make the slightest effort to determine why these planning/management 
-problems existed, to educate citizens to deal with them, or to make 
any serious proposals for fulfilling (as opposed to elaborating) his job 
description. It is small wonder that academics and especially foreign 
academics are not universally held in high regard - indeed the degree 
and breadth of tolerance for them is what strikes the author as sur-
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"Intellectual imperialism" or "one way dependence" is a more parti-, 
cularly inter-country issue (albeit it can arise among institutions in
a single country!). The "hewers of wood and drawers of water" model 
has applied to Third World academicians and is deeply resented. The 
cuite apparent sensitivity to foreign social scientists is a mix 
of objection to being mined of time and materials, or being organized 
in outside directed "teams" and of being organized at the conceptual 
level with little concern for either "provincial" or broader insights 
from the host social science community.
Part of this tension is inevitable. The part resulting from the 
interplay of "provincial" and "universal" is arguably healthy. That 
resulting from the need to import senior personnel and export students 
for advanced education is inescapable until the flow of students and of 
scholars is two-way. However, the part resulting from a hier­
archical structure in academia with the Third World participants at 
the bottom is not merely unsound but in most cases quite unnecessary.
South-North relations face slightly different problems. The 
Northern social science eommunities, as a whole, do not take Southern 
intellectual initiatives seriously (unless the Southerners in question 
move to the North!). This, quite reasonably, leads to irritation 
directly and indirectly increases suspicion of the nature of the 
Northern academic presence in the South. The case for interpene­
tration of ideas, techniques, institutions and personnel is either mult 
directional or hierarchical, and the latter is no longer acceptable 
to most Third World social sciences communities (nor to the author).
South-South social science communications problems are quite 
different. The most general unsatisfactory characteristic is the need 
tor North mediation. The links even within continents and a fortiori 
among them are few and tenuous within the South. While a start has 
ceen made and - perhaps unintentionally - is being facilitated by 
“he quasi-intellectual bureaucracies of international organizations,
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South-South academic discussion based on cross-country experience 
leans heavily on use of Northerners. While there is no reason 
Northerners should not be involved, there is a logical case for supposing 
that, as the majority of comparative Western European scholars are 
Western Europeans, so the majortiy of comparative African (or South 
Asian) scholars should be Arican or South Asian. This is an area 
in which the establishment of effective channels of communication, 
contact, exchange of personnel have not developed very fully or 
very well despite a substantial number of starts, often ending in a 
substantial number of similar breakdowns. (This comment holds even 
more forcibly for the managerial/public service quasi-academic 
community in respect to planning than it does for academicians.)
Intra-Academy Communications and Controversies
The issues clustered here have little in principle to do with
planning or with the Third World or even with social sciences as
such. However, as they are relevant to each of them taken separately 
and to their overlapping segments, they deserve mention at this point.
Mention is the operative term - to discuss them in full, let alone 
seek to resolve them would be a rather fruitless task as a spinoff 
from considering planning and the social sciences!
1. A.uthoritarianism: Academia and academics tend to be authori-
authoritarian in practice (even when very much the reverse
in principle). Platonic Guardians and Machiavellian 
puppet masters for Princes are inherently authoritarian 
models. They are, perhaps, even commoner among intellectual 
bureaucrats than in the academies proper. More 
generally, social scientists, when convinced of the truth 
of a position, have a tendency to seek to ’’convert'' others
(especially those they consider unable to see reality because they 
are a bit dense) by any means which comes to hand.
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This reaches its absurd culmination in the models which 
specify what the "masses want" and reject any comment 
that the masses demonstrably do not see it that way - 
on the grounds that this is the result of "false con­
sciousness" but that the modeller knows the true desires 
of the masses. Apart from being better icysticism than 
Marxism, this is a very fashionable academic form of 
authoritarianism widely applied to planning. (Its 
conservative variant simply omits the claim that the 
masses in any sense want what is proposed, merely argu­
ing that it would be "good for them," which has the virtue 
of greater honesty and less muddle but hardly of greater 
participation, discourse or non-authoritarianism.)
2. Perceiving human action as "experiments." There may be
a case for some scholars operating from this stance, how­
ever, precisely because nobody and no community views it­
self/themselves as experiments, this approach abstracts 
and falsifies. This is quite apart from whether the 
viewer agrees or disagrees.
3. Operating from identifiable (and multiple?) points of out­
look. Global views of vantage points have merit. So, how­
ever do those from particular classes, villages, towns, 
small countries, regions. For most human beings these
are their points of outlook. Presumptively one of the 
strengths of social science work is to transcend, not to 
ignore, to synthesize, not to ignore, particular view­
points, but another is logically to increase understanding 
of, precision within, and effective aonlication of the 
particular ones. Synthetic globalism or 'universality
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which amounts to generalizing and exporting one particular 
vantage point's outlook is arguably the exact opposite 
of serious social science (V.S. Naipul to the contrary 
notwithstanding).
b . Commitment, detachment and values are hardly issues to be 
"solved" here. However, two points may be made. No person 
and probably no piece of social science work is "value 
free," and to pretend otherwise is not helpful to 
clarity or to honest discourse. Commitment and de­
tachment are both possible virtues and potential vices. 
Praise singers are usually worse for their heroes than 
destructive academic critics for their enemies! Petronius 
is a type of intellectual who still has his uses. This 
is true even in such applied fields as planning. What 
is critical is not that everyone have the same values 
or balance of commitment/detachment, but that values be 
seen clearly and the balance of commitment or aloofness 
related plausibly to the particular piece of work to 
hand.
5. Education - mobilization - indoctrination is an "irreg­
ular declension" problem a la: I educate with careful
attention to showing the logic of my position and the 
errors of my critics; you tend to mobilize a bit un­
critically; he engages in crass indoctrination. Part of 
the problem is contextual: elementary civics lessons,
dialogue on adult education with a community group poten­
tially interested in organizing a program and blocked by 
an overtly oppressive group, and a graduate seminar on the 
nature of a state have rather different requirements. Part
*3*3 /-O /
relates back to the authoritarianism which appears to be 
deeply ingrained in social scientists (and perhaps 
social science and ideas more generally). The first, at 
least, could yield to more reasoned discourse which might 
also help promote somewhat more tolerance/awareness of the 
danger in respect to the second and to a less envenomed and 
more lucid dialogue on the uses of conveying data, encourag­
ing thinking, mobilizing for action, convincing of the 
correctness of ideas, preaching values.
Applied Social Sciences: A Tour D*Horizon
No brief summary of the contributions of applied social science 
to thinking about/action toward development in general or planning in 
particular can be anything more than scrappy and provocative. Two 
angles of entry are of potential use: capsule comments on individual
social science disciplines, and a more general glance at the inter­
action between social science and social actors or actions.
The disciplines sketched here are: economics (economic science),
political economy, geography, sociology, government (political science), 
history, education, psychology, law, religious studies (theology). 
Doubtless there are cases for additions, redivisions (e.g. anthropologists 
will probably resent the merger of sociology and anthropology), and/ 
or deletions (-law and theology are not be any means always listed as 
social sciences). The tour d'horizon which follows is biased in 
two senses - the writer's planning experience is dominantly in 
Africa and the smaller South-Southeast Asian states, and his own major 
discipline is political economy with secondary interactions largely
with law and theology.
Economics has asserted, achieved and maintained a position of 
"queen of the social sciences" in respect to development and planning. 
In large part this relates both to economists' propensity to answer 
questions put to them (even if they do not know, or have no reason 
to suppose they know, the answers) and to their claim that economic 
science is value-free and applicable on behalf of any rational set of 
goals. To a degree these weaknesses have strengths - applied social 
science must answer social actors' questions or it rules itself out of 
relevance; to assume that all means are 100% tied to particular ends 
(values) is a remarkably non-operational approach to decision taking 
or programme development. Nonetheless, they are ultimately weaknesses 
and ones compounded by the fact that economists (naturally) have a bias 
(even if some fight against it) toward economism, i.e., believing 
that the questions central to their disciplines are always the most 
important ones and the starting point for answering other questions. 
(Keynes' view that economics was rather akin to plumbing - a dignified, 
useful, not very intellectual field of endeavour which was working 
test when noticed least - has never had much favour in the profession!) 
Political Economy (whether revived classical, Marxian, or other) 
attempts to grapple with the interaction between values, which are 
very often not usefully defined in economic terms, and means, which 
are almost always both economic and political. Whether its claim 
to be the logical organizing focus for ail applied social sciences 
is valid is a different matter; its assertion of a greater breadth 
and realism than economic science is more soundly based. Unfortunately 
it tends to be combined with a lesser degree of technical preficiency
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and a certain ambiguity on what degree of freedom does exist between 
particular means/techniques and ends/goals in applied political 
economic fields such as planning.
C-eography as a social science does not appear to have a uniform 
self definition. Certainly there are geography departments and 
institutes which are very much in the applied social science field.
These usually do succeed in using geography's historic natural science 
links and an extension of them to agricultural science to acquire 
greater specificity than sociology and greater relationship to 
particular situations than economic science. However, the uses 
limitations of this approach have usually been unclear both to the 
geographers and to the potential users with the latter tending to 
suppose geography to be a branch of local physical planning. Thao 
seems an unduly narrow perspective.
Sociology is the social science least inclined to answer applied 
questions in a fashion intelligible to the questioner. Its defenders 
relate this to intellectual honesty and its critics to fuzzy- 
mindedness. Classical colonial anthropology was an exception - 
knowledge as the basis for the power to manipulate was its motive force. 
However, the anthropology sub-discipline of sociology has - at least 
in the Third World - recanted against this, albeit not against a 
defense of "pluralism" and "conservation of tradition" which at 
times appears obscurantist and even more frequently drives the 
practicing planner) who really has no option of doing nothing to 
distractions.
government ''political science) cannot in this context be viewed as 
one discipline. Administration as a means of oroviding nuts and bolts 
education and techniques has been and remains influential. Development
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administration - rather unfortunately - vas a child of the "growth 
and moderizaticn" export boom and has virtually perished with it. 
Political theory is doubless influential, but more in Keynes "voices 
in the air" sense than as a systematic input into development thinking 
or planning. The absence of an usuable, operational state theory 
is noteworthy. As a generalist organizing discipline for development, 
political science has suffered partly because politicians are more 
convinced they know politics than that they know economics and 
partly because it has not been able to answer the rather larger 
number of practical questions (in planning or development more 
generally) which at least on the face of it are primarily economic. 
Whether the adoption of a set of economic methodological approaches 
(ones which an increasing number of development economists think 
ill-suited within their own discipline), including a slightly arti- 
factual variant of econometrics, is a valid answer to these 
limitations remains to be seen - the author is sceptical even though 
at the level of discourse and insights some of the tools appear to have 
force.
History has suffered from its use by non-historians and from the 
descriptive school of historians. The first turn history into a 
religion or a myth, which may or may not make it appealing but hardly 
relates to its nature or uses as a social science. The latter make 
it boring, often intellectually imperialistic and quite impossible 
to apply except as a source of snippets of data. Despite this, 
political economists (and to a lesser extent government specialists?) 
have a high regard for the potential contributions of history as - 
rather surprisingly - do many managers and political decision takers 
if history is interpreted as. running up to yesterday, with the last 50
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or 10 years as valid a field of inquiry as the previous 5,000.
Education is in a functional sense a very influential social science 
in the development field. When married to economics (or occasionally 
political economy) its child, "manpower planning" is even more 
influential. However, education has had a substantially lesser 
impact at the overall intellectual level. Manpower planning has. 
escaped from education (in the applied institutional sense) 
precisely because of this. Similarly, to ask that agricultural extension 
should be viewed as primarily a problem in education with educational 
insights as critical as agricultural, tends to arouse even greater 
bemusement among educators than among agronomists. Apparently the 
applied role of training teachers, while bringing money and prestige, 
has also narrowed and shallowed the intellectual nature of the 
discipline.
Psychology has rarely been percieved as a major social science input 
into development thinking or praxis. What psychological development 
models there have been (and the number is not all that small) 
have been constructed (or concocted) by members of other disciplines.
It is not self-evident that this situation is inevitable nor that 
psychology cannot be more coherently integrated into development and 
planning thinking and practice. However, there appears to be little 
sign of this happening in the immediate future.
Law has , like education, -been functionally useful in development administration 
alDeit planning is something of an exception to the rule in this respect. 
However, also like education, law has not been treated as a discipline 
with a central intellectual or organizing contribution. The intital 
law and development effort was a singularly "universal export model" one,
"i'h the result that its art if actual heritage of laws is mixed and
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its contribution to law being seen as an integral element in indigenous 
development as often negative as positive. Some rebuilding of efforts 
toward identifying the role of law in development have begun but 
not on a broad front.
Theology (Religious Studies) has had substantial, if very uneven, 
influence on development thinking and parctice, but more via the 
plazas and the value frames of decision takers than through influencing 
officials or contributing to discussion of means or targets. While 
unlike other social science disciplines, theology probably has relatively 
little to say about techniques ( a viewpoint writers like the 
present President of Iran would reject), its concern with goals does 
require that it pay somewhat more coherent attention to major means 
and interim goals and take part in more extensive discourse with 
other social science disciplines on development.
Interactions Among The Social Sciences
It is a platitude to remark that discourse among the social sciences 
is inadequate and that what passes for joint approaches often 
involves parallel proposals made by individuals or groups who do 
not bother to listen to each other - to auditors who can hardly be 
faulted if the story of the Tower of Babel springs to their minds. 
However, there are no simple answers - or rather none that do not 
create equally acute problems.
a. To create masterful polymaths who know all the relevant 
concepts and techniques of all the social science 
disciplines is impractical. Knowing one relatively 
thoroughly,two more to some extent, and being able 
to carry on an informed discussion with the others is
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the maximum which any normal academician can achieve
h. to delegate commanding authority to one discipline 
which then organized the others is confusing line 
decision - taking and managerial organization with 
intellectual interaction-discourse-contribution. In 
fact, the "queen of the social sciences," eras 
theology, law, and (now or just ending?) economics 
science have been rather damaging in their long-term 
impact on the disciplines in question;
c. to cut development up into discrete "problem" areas -
e.g. urban housing, rural water, income distribution, 
foreign resource management - has very definite uses.
However, the disciplinary requirements in each packet
still exceed any one person's (or any synthetic discipline's) 
range, and there are still interactions and overlaps 
among the newly defined categories. One does not do 
away with links and interactions by redefining topical 
areas;
d. to say that relating and synthesizing disciplines is 
the duty of the final decision taker is in a sense true. 
However, it is hardly an excuse for lack of disciplinary 
interaction and discourse - if the social scientists 
cannot understand one another it is slightly ’unreasonable 
to expect a decision taker to be able to do so simply 
because he is not a specialist in any (unless one 
supposes his reaction will be "a plague on all ycur houses"!)
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and, so long as social scientists remain in contact with each other,
the advisors and programmers can incorporate the work of the describers,
analysts, and critics and be complemented by (at least some of) the 
12/ 
mobilizers.
The somewhat shaky social science perception of relative time 
spans is probably linked to the problematic nature of interactions 
with reality. On the one hand there is the danger already cited to 
think sub speciae aeternitatis, which has its uses for certain types 
of description and analysis but is not directly applicable to development, 
let alone planning. However, an equally prevalent strand can be 
characterized (or caricatured) as the "New Jerusalem Yesterday or 
Never" approach which argues that, if ultimate goals are not reached 
in a very short time, this proves the approach to be wrong. Hopefully, 
this is not correct - social sciences stand very much under that 
general damnation if it is! More immediately to the point, it 
is an approach which tends to infuriate even the most open and 
reasonable of decision takers and managers.
Commitment/detachment also overlaps types of interaction with 
reality. Mobilization is a form of interaction which almost 
inherently requires commitment - and preferrably commitment to 
something beyond organization for its own sake! Description and 
criticism can be from a detached viewpoint (which has some particular 
strengths and weaknesses) or based on passionate pro or con commitment 
(which affords other weaknesses and strengths). As with choice 
of type of relationship, there is no evident case for uniformity, 
but there is one for social scientists making clear what their commitments 
or detachments are (or at least what they believe them to be!).
Social Science-Social Action-Social Actors
The interaction of social science, social scientists, other 
social actors, and social action is problematic. This is especially 
true when social scientists are operationally or quasi-operationally 
involved in programmes and projects designed and directed by 
other social actors. That of course is by definition the case in 
planning.
The relationship of the social sciences to reality Is an issue 
of theoretical and practical, intellectual and praxis concern - both 
generally and In relation to development. Attempting either to define 
a particular interaction which is universally valid or to say that 
each social scientist In each context; should operate on the same 
spectrum of interactions Is almost certainly otiose. Both individuals 
and contexts vary too much for that. Description, criticism, 
analysis, prescription, mobilization, alteration are all legitimate 
relationships between social sciences and social scientists and reality. 
Each can be abused - dispassionate description of, let alone social 
engineering for, genocide raises intellectual problems no matter 
how asceptic the genocide nor how cogently it is justified on triage or 
financial stabilization programme premises. Not all can be combined 
in all contexts - to be a critic of, a mobilizer for basic changes in 
the goals and personnel of, and a detailed programmatic analyst and 
advisor to the corridors of power always poses dilemmas, but in some 
cases is simply implausible (e.g. Chile today). Nor, if one may apply 
an economic postulate more broadly, is there any reason to reject 
specialization and division of labor1, personal oredilections and 
are not usually uniform across all of the relationships
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choices among means, even if some means can he used for a range of 
ends.
Second, the value-free ends posed in this definition are on more 
careful inspection very value-loaded indeed. Sometimes they include 
the greater efficiency of "free markets" which is a logical and 
intellectual absurdity unless one states the goals and constraints 
toward which/within which the efficiency is to be directed/limited.
(Pareto optimality for:-'example takes income distribution as a given - 
by no means a value neutral assumption.) In less extreme cases 
they are merely economistic - more gross domestic product is always 
better than less and can always be redistributed either during or 
after production. It is not self evident that more physical goods 
and services always are better than less. Redistribution during or 
after production is not as*plastic as this approach supposes. To 
the extent that external vulnerability is altered there is a perfectly 
good economic case for "notional" insurance premium charges against 
solutions involving greater risks (even if political decision takers 
would not put the concept in those terms, they understand it quite 
well!).
At a somewhat different level, planning is frequently described 
as writing a plan. That is an aspect of planning (not as it happens 
an essential one), but the author (who admits to being somewhat eccentric 
on this point, is unable to comprehend how it can be advanced as a 
definition of the whole. If planning is a process relating to changing 
reality (or, more accurately, altering the directions and tempos of change), 
then the data collection, analysis and positing of subsequent actions 
to be taken are importanx but by no means adequate in themselves.
Planning: Notes Toward A Definition
A very real problem in discussing social science contributions 
to planning is deciding what planning is or ought to be. It cannot 
be said that one of the more notably successful contributions of the 
social sciences to planning lies in arriving at a clear, reasonably 
accepted definition. There are at least three common definitions, 
all of which appear to the present author to be slightly absurd.
Planning has been defined as the hallmark of a functioning 
socialist transition to a socialist political economy. In the first 
place this raises very severe problems for handling macro (e.g., 
enterprise) planning at all for serious discussion of techniques 
In the second, it is either false or confusing because it redefines a 
generally used term without giving proper warning to the auditor.
The only type of economy which does not have significant macro planning 
is one in which the dominant political decision-taking group is 
virtually totally responsible/responsive to a set of capitalist sub­
classes who both find it more convenient to handle macro social organization 
themselves rather than via the state and have no secondary divergences 
requiring mediation through the state. The nearest thing to an 
example that comes to mind is Hong Kong. Even relatively stable, 
highly inegalitarian capitalist economies - e.g. Singapore, South 
Korea, Brazil to take a range - find it prudent to practice rather 
extensive planning. Actually creating the conditions for primitive
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accumulation in a previously planned (or muddled) political economy 
requires very interventionist and forceful planning indeed - vide Chile 
of Cauas, or Sri Lanka today. Capitalist planning may have very 
different goals and interim targets from socialist (although the 
particular tools used are not necessarily equally different), but 
to say that it is net planning appears to obfuscate rather than 
illuminate.
A more or less inverse definition takes planning to be a body 
of analytical and programmatic techniques which are value-free and 
(in the extreme forms of this definitional pattern) serve value-free 
goals which are universally acceptable. This may be a useful way 
of proceeding within a given context in which goals are fairly 
clearly agreed and stable and the main questions are ones of means 
and techniques. Certainly^ some of the more creative work using this 
definition springs from precisely that type of background. However, 
as a general intellectual or cross-national approach (or even one 
within a single state in which goals are either net agreed or not stable) 
it suffers from two types of major limitations.
First, it is true to say that means are not one-to-one correllated 
with goals, but quite untrue to deny that means do influence points 
of arrival and that some means are inconsistent with some goals. - e.g. 
computerized material balances planning without a dual price system 
is quite inconsistent with decentralized, participatory operation of 
the planning process, as well as hopelessly unsuitable technically 
for economies with very bad data flow channels and a large number of 
relatively isolated areas and production units. Ends do determine
Necessary, yes; sufficient, no. The plan document itself is a 
convenient guidebook, mobilizing statement, reference point but is 
not even necessary let alone sufficient (indeed a number of countries 
have had and have plan volumes which bear no evident relation to perfectly 
real planning processes - e.g. at times Sri Lanka - or which bear 
very complex and problematic relationships indeed - e.g. Kenya since 
independence).
To attack this definition is not to attempt to break a butterfly 
upon a wheel. Its prevalance has had negative consequences. Planning 
units have seen their task as finished when the plan appeared 
(or rather oddly shifted to very micro, traditional Treasury assess­
ments of individual collections of bricks and mortar) and chosen 
their techniques and personnel skills with this limited definition 
of their role in mind. Other ministries and units have welcomed this 
definition since it allowed them to play lip service to planning while 
"getting on with the job" as they perceived it. Academicians have 
also selected techniques and analytical vantage points to suit 
the definition and had the benefit of being involved in the section 
of the planning process with the highest ratio of inspiration to 
perspiration and of creative thought to drudgery. But planning does 
not stop with the "plan" any more than budgeting stops with the 
estimates' publication - or, if it does, it has nothing to do with 
reality. institutional creation and reform, administrative development,
. monitoring and data flow processes/channels, techniques for early 
warning of deviations and for prompt, coherent modification to fall 
oack or opportunistic advance) positions are just as much part of 
planning as building up the initial guideposts.
A '.Corking Definition
A more inclusive definition might he: planning is a process of 
utilizing and allocating scarce resources to achieve a set group of 
targets which represent progress toward longer-term goals (or values) 
within a given time frame.
This type of definition need not he economistic - there is no 
automatic reason to equate scarce resources with finance of foreign 
exchange,to set only economic quantity targets, or to assume that 
"final"gcals and underlying values are wholly (or even predominately) 
economic. However, it is true that real resources of various types 
are virtually always a constraint on achieving other targets.
Therefore, achieving growth in the availability of scarce resources is 
normally a critical target whether it is seen as a general means to 
target fulfillment or as an "intermediate end". In poor politics/ 
economics "zero growth" and development are not compatible, even if 
rapid growth is by no means an adequate condition for development.
In general form, such a definition of planning does not specify 
goals. However, this characteristic vanishes as soon as any specific 
planning in any actual context is studied (or operated). Goals 
are central to selection of targets and of means in a way much more 
subtle than a simply plugging them into an otherwise universal 
process. This approach appears to have the best chance of avoiding 
the pitfalls of defining planning processes only in terms of goals 
and contexts so that no general topic exists at all and of defining 
them in such a mechanistic way that planning appears to be purely 
a matter of techniques, with both goals and contexts minor secondary
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irritations (as is implementation in some definitions;.
However, this definitional approach highlights the analytical 
gap in respect to usable state theory. Indeed much social science 
literature on planning extends this gap further by having no adequate 
descriptive apparatus either in respect to the state or to instituional/ 
bureaucratic operation. Without these, values are not simply determined 
outside the planning process per se, they drop out of the sky in 
a totally unexplained way and cannot be checked for "validity" within 
any particular planning process. In addition, a large body of major 
technical and operational issues cannot be handled (not, incidentally, 
including a majority of "implementation" issues) because of the abstraction 
from bureaucracy/institutions/administration.
A possible "state theory" construct for planning would be that 
of a dominant decision-taking group. This approach allows such a 
group to be a "coalition", to change over time, to operate on 
multiple goals, to relate to institutions in non-homogenous ways -
i.e. one coalition fraction dominant in respect to some and other in 
respect to different institutions. Objections to that approach are 
in large measure either academic objections to the complexity of reality 
or economists' objections to non-economistic goals and processes 
(which is perhaps another variant of the objection to complex realities!). 
It is certainly true that if the coalition/decision-taking group has a 
set of goals with very complex tradeoffs, is characterized by rapid 
shrits in balances of power, and is accompanied by individual institutions 
being dominated by particular fractions with very different goals and 
priorities among them, major intellectual problems arise in respect 
-o planning. So they should — major real problems in terms of the
operation of the process arise under precisely those conditions!
Similarly, some working institutional theory is needed within 
planning definitional and conceptual frameworks. Otherwise the 
ways in which administration and management function and the particular 
characteristics of "bureaucrats" and of institutions are abstracted 
from, with substantial cost to the completeness, ablility to project 
or analyze results, and overall rationality of the planning process 
and of the social science contribution to it.
T.v~nat Are The Goals?
It is certainly true that problems arise intellectually - and 
operationally - because dominant goals are not always, perhaps not 
even usually, stated precisely and openly. Published planning documents 
deal very much in short and intermediate term targets. Further, they 
may - for quite good reasons so far as the decision takers are 
concerned - not merely omit statements as to longer term values, 
but make quite misleading statements either for purposes of domestic 
coalition protection or for those of securing external support.
One implication is that the effective planning technician (it is 
rather arrogant to call the clerks the planners!) must have enough 
contact and discourse with and enough understanding of and sympathy 
with relevant decision-takers to understand what their basic goals, 
oriorities and targets are. The majority of planning technicians - aca­
demic or bureaucratic, citizen or expatriate - in many countries neither 
achieve this nor perceive its necessity. One can hardly claim that the 
social science contribution as it now stands has done much to help 
clarify its significance for them.
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Indeed there has been a rather perverse contribution. This is 
the explicit or implicit argument that the planning technician (in 
such work always termed planner) because he has more command of 
information and language can substitute his own goals for those of 
the political decision-takers who will not notice the difference 
at first and later will either welcome it or be trapped into continuing 
their "Platonic Guardian's " path. Questions of responsibility aside 
(what right as a technician to substitute his judgement of values 
for that of a political decision taker?), the argument vastly 
overstates the strength of the intellectual and the bureaucrat.
They can and do influence decisions, they can and do fail to implement 
decisions threatening to them - a point social science research has 
not handled very well, albeit it is now a growth area. In cases of 
close rapport between decisicn-taker and intellectual or official 
technician, the latter may influence goals and basic choices. But 
to suppose that the clerks can take control and manipulate the 
political heads in an illusion.
Perhaps the most striking example of that illusion and its 
limits was in Sri Lanka in the early 1970s. The then Minister for 
Finance was an intellectual in politics. He secured adoption of 
a set of tax policies which would have wiped out accumulated wealth in 
two decades, made inheritance impracticable as a route to passing 
wealth or power, but allowed rapid accumulation by risk-taking 
entrepreneurs (falling to the state on their death). As a programme 
for gradual transition to socialism by parliamentary means this seems 
commendable. But it was approved by a cabinet and passed by a 
parliament dominated by a small capitalist-led and based party.
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The Minister has been the ultimate in the clerk misleading the decision
takers. Within a few years the policies were reversed. Worse,
he had - by his tactical concessions for one generation to entrepreneurs -
confused and alienated his own base; he and his party were wiped
out in the 1977 elections! The fate of the typical planning technician
who sets out to reshape national goals may not be as dramatic - it will
be quite as ineffectual in achieving its own goal.
What Is Planning About?
If the working definition suggested earlier is accepted, planning 
is basically about procedures, techniques and efficiency as they 
relate to achieving targets which are at one and the same time consistent 
and possible, as well as directed to achieving goals which are 
'ultimately more basic than exogenous to the planning process. To 
attempt to integrate the goals into the definition of planning is 
either to limit aefinitons to specific contexts and goal sets, or 
to create confusion by giving the impression that goals are universal, 
agreed and value-free. For example, equality of results or equality 
of opportunity (very different things indeed - in practice often 
opposites) is a possible real (and a more frequent verbal goal).
If it is a basic goal, then a series of requirements as to targets, 
policies and techniques follow. Knowing whether it is a goal and with 
what priority is critical to planning technicians 1 own efficiency 
and their knowledge as it affects choice of targets, policies, means, 
techniques is equally important. But equality is not a universal 
goal. (In, for example. Singapore and Kenya it is not simply 
not a goal but is radically inconsistent with the actual goals 
informing the planning process - as the Prime Minister of Singapore
is admirably open in asserting.) To talk as if it were and to define 
nlanning processes generally to incorporate it, is to confuse 
the author's idea of the desirable with the actual. It is not 
sensible to criticize the Singapore planning process for not producing 
less inequality (or for increasing inequality) independently from 
a critical analysis of the nature of Singapore's political economy 
and state decision-taking group goals. If the planning process did 
promote equality, it would be inefficient in terms of the requirements 
of those it is set up to serve.
Another area of setting limits relates to when planning ends and 
management or administration or mobilization or any other more 
"routine" activity begins. while it is logically clear that the 
publication of a plan is a very bad cutoff point and that to define 
every act of implementing, participating in or responding to a plannin 
policy, target, project or programme as planning is too broad, where 
to draw a line is much less clear. Monitoring performance, revising 
policies/programmes coherently to respond to changed contexts or 
unexpected results, reviewing experience and relating to new/altered/ 
continued sets of decision-taker priorities are part of the planning 
process. So is the designing and setting up of new institutions, 
enterprises, action groups, communities, sub-classes, parties also
I
engage in planning.) Beyond that, broad definitions and rules of 
thumb probably cease to be of much help - one needs to look at a par­
ticular situation and trace through implications and interactions 
oe^ore reaching a working decision (or an article, policy paper, a 
lecture, an action memorandum).
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Is Planning Universal Cr Provincial?
As defined planning is relatively universal. The concept of 
organizing in a way consistent with progress toward goals is not 
uniquely Western or industrial. The ideas of constant, unidirectional, 
"progress” and "modernization” are more time-and-culture bound but 
are hardly essential to planning. Nor are participatory and people's- 
movement approaches inherently in opposition to planning - their 
targets are the decision-takers and, more particularly, their policies 
and goals. However, there are worldviews which have little place for 
planning - mysticism and astrology are examples (which is not to 
assert they have much also in common), as may be forms of "populism" 
which really do depend on pure emotional response and mass interaction.
However, there is a different sense in which planning as defined 
is always "provincial". It is context bound because goals arise from 
and relate to contexts and because different targets/instruments/techniques 
are important and feasible in varying contexts. This is not to deny 
similarities among and possibilities of fruitful interchange between 
planning experiences. It is to warn that the quest for the "universal 
model plan" is a variant of the quest for El Dorado and that prepackaged 
export model planning processes, plans, or plan components are rather 
likely to be inappropriate technology or, at the least, to require rather 
extensive adaptation, climatization, and expert installation before 
they operate well. Even then they are unlikely to operate as their 
designers envisaged; but that can be a strength.
The danger in this definitional approach is that it appears to
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remove all moral-ethical-value judgement responsibility from planning
technicians and social scientists. Appears, rather than' does. In
the first palee, the articulation and application of values is a
commoner and - in immediate impact to real human beings here and not
at least - often a more important aspect than decisions on basic
verities. In the second, it is one thing to say a national planning
process is designed (or logically ought to be designed) to implement
the goals of the dominant decision-taking coalition and another to
say whether an individual should cooperate in that process or work
for the modification/conversion/substitution/elimination of that
decision-taking coalition. Hjalmar Schacht's economic planning
both for the Weimar Republic and for the Third Reich was efficient in
terms of the (rather different) decision takers he served. ‘That does
not mean that individuals'or social scientists need take the same view
of both exercises' moral propriety. Just as there is unlikely to be
a "universal model plan", there are no universal planning technicians,
not simply because no one has adequate disciplinary and contextual
knowledge but because the range of goals and values any one individual
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can work for and live with himself is limited.
VI.
Content and Technique; Scraps Toward Guidelines
To survey all planning techniques and instruments in a short 
paper is hardly practicable...to study them widely enough to do so 
"Culd require so long that the survey would be out of date. Nor 
is a compact survey of their relationships with social science methodology
(rather direct in many cases and ultimately substantial in almost 
all) any more practical. What can be attempted are a few points 
which are striking to one oberver/participant in one non-randomly 
selected set of planning processes.
The first is the tendency to treat techniques out of context 
as if they were meccano kit parts which could be fitted together into 
an infinite number of designs and whose laws of interaction and 
combination were "natural", "immutable" and value-free. While perhaps 
pedagogic ally convenient and avoiding the opposite mistakes - such 
as defining input-output analysis as inherently capitalist (because 
it was designed for use in the New Economic Policy) or inherently 
Communist (because it was first used in the=NEP8 ) - this is neither intellectually 
nor operationally satisfactory.
Techniques and policies can only be understood and applied 
adequately within a context. In particular they need to be analyzed 
and applied in relation to goals. Incomes and prices policies, for 
example, can be used to alter income distribuiton toward minimum 
wage earners, salariat, peasants, or capitalists. The meaning of 
profit-oriented policies may not be the same in the context of a 
largely state-owned, directly productive sector - may not, since an 
examiniation of the sector's own use of surplus and distribution 
of income is required before a complete evaluation.
Further techniques often have underlying theoretical assumptions 
(or alternative sets). This is true of both capitalist and socialist 
inflation control techniques (oddly similar at some levels but sharply 
divergent at the theoretical). It is equally true of techniques 
which inherently or de_ facto assume enterprise-dominated markets, 
government-managed markets, or non-market allocation systems as the
5 V
55/
dominant form of resource direction. Related to this is studying 
and clarifying the uses and limitations of techniques - e.g. , standard 
market economy banking legislation is, perhaps, not very usable in 
a transition to socialist economy with very limited money markets 
or intermediation; per contra, public enterprise management techniques, 
assuming a Soviet model of material balance allocations and requirements 
set from outside for the enterprise,are distinctly inadequate for a 
manager in either an enterprise-dominated government managed market 
context.
The Great Powers: Capital/Output, Capital Budget, Cost/Benefit
Applied social science contributions to planning revolve very 
largely around three concepts and clusters of techniques. Even in 
the cases of disciplines other than economics there has been a 
notable tendency to adjust approaches and vocabularies to interact 
with this triad: Capital/Output (Harrod-Domar-Ffeldman and their
extended families), Capital Budgeting (Traditional Treasury Candle 
End Collection Revisited), Cost/Benefit Analysis (Little-Mirlees 
and Related Black Boxes). Each of these is a useful analytical 
approach and gives rise to a useful body of techniques. Each has 
been overdeveloped in the academy and overanplied in crudely 
reductionist forms in actual planning with results that lend little 
credit to social science and offer little development to the users 
and used.
The problem is not that these techniques are totally in­
appropriate nor universally lack power. Rather it is application 
in inappropriate contexts, overgeneralization, intellectual hegemony,
ision or downgrading or other techniques/analytical tools.
The relationship of fixed investment to output is important. So are 
related questions of production structure and of capital/output ratios. 
However, fixed investment is very far from being the whole of development, 
and attempts to treat other elements - e.g., education, health - as invest­
ment in people wholly analagous to fixed investment do not seem the most 
satisfactory approach to these topics. Nor is it possible to attempt any 
general planning of production structures nor any systematic selection of 
particular projects simply on the basis of capital/output ratios.
Similarly, capital project budgeting is of some importance. (it ill 
behooves the author as a Treasury economist to downgrade nuts and bolts 
Treasury function! ) But it is very far from being a systematic approach to 
planning and tends to substitute for serious attention either to policy 
or to the operating results of public infrastructural or enterprise 
investment. When taken together with capital/output analysis it has 
contributed to a standard -.tendency to underestimate the importance of 
working capital and to confuse the uses of constant price projections 
with the real planning problems of budgeting and of credit which, ex 
definitio, must be operated in current prices.
Cost/benefit analysis is useful, especially if one recognizes that 
any desired cost or benefit can be plugged in (so long as it can to a 
degree be estimated). However, cost/benefit as a general analytical and 
planning approach is a rather different matter - it rests on surprisingly 
artificial assumptions both about the nature Qf the world economy and 
the goals of decision takers and about the quantity and quality of data 
available. Social cost/benefit analysis has led to even greater prac­
tical problems - converting all gains into artificial "market value" 
ecuivalents in order to arrive at a ’unique "payoff" number hides real 
tradeoffs and substitutes technicians' guesses or prejudices for proper 
uresentarion of alternatives to decision takers.
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Mathematics, Models and Proj ections
Mathematics, models and projections have also suffered from uncritical 
use. The first need in any context is to consider carefully their uses 
and limitations. For example, elaborate econometric calculations on the 
basis of short time series composed of numbers themselves marked by dubious 
accuracy or consistency and relating to an economy in which structural 
change is rapid, have a spurious elegance and precision but very little 
content. Models, by their nature, are abstractions from a more complex 
reality to illustrate/examine certain elements thought to be key. There­
fore, the critical questions are whether the selected elements are in 
fact crucial and whether the ether factors held constant or formulated in 
initial assumptions are both less important and plausibly represented.
Even then models remain much more suggestive and indicative than directly 
usable for elaborating programmes. Projections are vital to planning - 
targeting without projecting whether the targets are feasible and what 
elements of existing patterns of change need to be altered to reach them, 
is a rather empty exercise. However, projections should specify the 
assumptions made (especially for subsequent use in evaluating or revising
them) and should normally state ranges of least unlikely results not
\
single numbers which again give a totally spurious impression of precision.
One useful result which may flow from mathematical exercises, modelling 
and projects (may, since in practice the opposite sometimes occurs) is con­
cern with data quality. Much more priority in planning ususally needs 
to oe given to getting approximately correct, reasonably up-to-date 
-ata. Similarly, planning technicians and social scientists would be 
■veil advised to go to basic sources and examine them for orobable mistakes
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or ranges of doubt before conducting elaborate exercises. The number of 
academic articles and of policy measures taken on the basis of statistical 
trends which subsequently turned out to represent errors, improvements, or 
deteriorations in the statistics not changes in reality is embarrassingly
high.
Speed, Simplicity, Qperationality
Planning techniques need to produce indications of what would happen 
’under certain assumptions and what has been happening rapidly. To have 
no answers when a decision needs to be taken and perfect data on why the 
decision was wrong six months after the event is very distinctly less 
satisfactory than having imperfect but approximately correct analyses at 
the time of taking the decision. Simplicity is also critical, not simply 
because it enhances speed but because effective planning requires that 
more institutions, managers, decision takers, mobilisers be brought into 
the process than are usually involved today. To do so requires techniques 
which they can operate and whose results they can understand.
Operationality is critical to planning - or any other applied social 
science area. (Even in research the value of techniques which allow one 
to set up an intellectual model but require data which is not and is 
unlikely to become available so that most of the categories remain empty 
is open to some doubt. This implies a need for greater concern with insti­
tutional and administrative techniques and procedures. It may well be no 
cart of planning to engage in day-to-day administration, but it certainly 
is a part to ensure that policies, programmes and projects can be managed/ 
administered. This requirement is remarkably frequently overlooked both
by academicians and by senior technocrats not themselves directly 
involved in the institutional or administrative operations in question. 
For example, taxes which, on paper, meet a number of fiscal efficiency 
criteria, promote desired income distribution and offer incentives to 
appropriate production/consumption responses, but which cannot be 
administered or bring tax administration to the verge of collapse, 
are a not very uncommon outcome of planning fiscal policy!
Similarly, what passes as planning administrative reform usually 
proceeds on the basis of techniques which seem to relate to the reality 
of administrative reformers and that of what can be fitted into simple 
two-dimensional diagrams but have, in most cases, no relation to the 
realities of the countries, institutions or administrative/managerial 
services supposedly to benefit from the reforms. (While the most 
trenchant critics of this weakness are academic social scientists, they 
are also among the intellectual sources and personnel pools for it.)
Two contributory factors appear to be yet another assumption that uni­
versal principles are all and provincial realities nothing (or worse 
than nothing) and that working administrators are mindless conservatives 
who have no useful ideas on how their systems could work better or the 
constraints relating to specific potentially useful changes.
Techniques, Programmes, Policies, Targets, Goals
The content of planning exercises is very largely the learning, 
use and evaluation of the results of techniques. This is probably 
even more true of the direct involvement of social scientists (as oppose 
b0 °heir more detached analysis of broader aspects of the process).
However, as suggested by the working definition used, techniques 
- a dependent not an independent variable. The starting point is
"Ou^e o0 c^cice, elaboration, articulation of techniques
lies through targets, programmes and policies flowing from (contributing to 
realisation of) the goals. That is admittedly an oversimplification - 
processes like this are always partly iterative. Techniques certainly 
can throw light on the validity of programmes and policies or, if tech­
niques for certain programmes and policies are simply not available, 
may force selection of alternatives for which the techniques exist. They 
may also demonstrate the implausibility, inconsistency or flat impossi­
bility of certain preliminary targets. Whether seen as techniques (and 
not as representations of deeper and broader analytical and explanatory 
systems) they are likely to affect goals much is open to doubt, However, the 
primary direction starts from goals and works down to identifying appro­
priate techniques - or at least it should. Planning exercises which 
appear to have teen constructed to fit the techniques known to or favoured 
by technicians are by no means unknown.
Continuity and Persever an oe
"To plan today and fly away is to live to plan another day" remarked 
a sympathetic and able expatriate planner in East Africa as he left "his" 
third plan in place. While few social scientists would wish to associate 
themselves with that way of putting it, the involvement of academics in 
planning often does verge on that approach.
The drawbacks are considerable:
..,1, It is almost impossible to create an ongoing process 
rather than an episodic set of plan-writing exercises 
loosely linked by annual capital budgeting;
2 . therefore policies, management and administration are
systematically underempnasized as are annual budgeting of 
scarce resources (whether finance, domestic credit, 
foreign exchange, skilled personnel, or construction 
capacity);
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3 . the initial creation/initiation of new techniques-programmes 
policies is seen as somehow complete in itself and their 
articulation, initial operation, modification to overcome 
early operating snags fall out of the picture.
These drawbacks are made even more severe when the academic teaching 
of future managers, administrators, planning technicians embodies the 
same assumptions about planning. The unfortunate fact that the ratio of 
inspiration to perspiration and of creative initiatives to making them 
work is about 1 to 99 very rarely comes through in teaching.
It can be said that this outlook is one to which expatriates are 
particularly prone and represents a very telling case for citizenisation. 
That is true, but some aspects of it inform much Third World academy 
thinking and practice so that, as is rather usual, citizenship is a 
necessary rather than a sufficient condition for developing a more 
satisfactory frame of reference.
What Is To Be Done?
In writing of problems it is easy to give a picture of total 
failure. In the case of social science interaction with development, 
and in particular with planning, that would be an unduly gloomy per­
ception. Neither in respect of potential nor of achievement nor of 
direction of change since 19^5 is the pattern or dynamic systematically 
negative - failures are in respect to needs and hopes rather than pre­
viously achieved standards. The conference of which this paper forms 
a part could not have been held in 19^5 ana if it had been attempted 
there would have been little experience to discuss. If it had been 
held in 1965 there would have been material, but it is inconceivable 
■-nat - as is the. case today - a clear majority of the oaper-writers 
participants would have been Southerners.
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The spectrum of achievements and possibilities is very wide. Indeed, 
it is arguably wider in the Third World than in the industrialised coun­
tries. Certainly there have been cases - e.g., the Uganda of Amin, the 
Equatorial Guinea of Macias - where the relationship of social science and 
social scientists to dominant social actors and actions was limited to 
survival and very often survival by departure or failure to survive; 
a pattern only too reminiscent of much of Europe in the Second World War. 
But even under regimes which are quite overtly repressive (even if their 
own chosen word for it is rarely that), there are degrees of freedom 
and types of relationship possible other than silence, covert opposition 
and suicide. Interaction between social scientists and the state in Zaire 
is not purely on the letter's terms; criticism and analysis are not per 
se passports to prison. In the Philippines it is the degrees of free­
dom allowed at least some serious critics, the latitude for social 
science research and proposal of alternatives and the opportunities
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for certain types of mobilization which are surprising, even if 
limited. 'The Northwestern analogues are perhaps Greece of the Colonels 
and Portugal of Caetane; the Northeast, Poland of the 1960's. Even 
in states about which many social scientists, including the author, 
have rather grave reservations there is often a genuine eagerness to 
hear and reflect on at least some criticism and discourse which is 
more than purely technical or marginal - Sri Lanka today is an 
exanole - ironically perhaps more so than it was under the LSFP 
gcvernmenx before 1977.
Nor is movement from the academy to the corridors of power as 
unusual or as confined to one class of state as might be supposed. 
Whatever reservations one has about the Brazilian military'regimes ,
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they have involved academicians and intellectuals in more than window- 
dressing or technical roles - Roberto Campos and Delfin Hetto are serious 
social scientists with technical competence and coherent commitments.
This may of course be a mixed blessing - the Chilean junta’s political 
economic policy was not merely implemented but in substantial measure 
designed by intellectuals (Chilean even if one suggests that their 
worldview was very much that of Chicago and of Friedmania). This, 
however, is not a question of exclusion of intellectuals but of value 
judgements. To condemn a regime because one disagrees with its values 
is one thing; to say that it does not involve social scientists 
seriously is another.
At the opposite end of the spectrum the problem is sometimes that 
of too great expectations of and calls upon social scientists. A fairly 
evident case is Tanzania where the readiness to receive and use research, 
including critical and programmatic research is much greater than the 
capacity to produce or to communicate it. Similarly, while it is a com­
pliment to the social sciences that a remarkable number of academic prac­
titioners have ended in the corridors of power as senior officials, 
managers, researchers or ministers, the high general opinion of the 
suitability of academic training as a preparation for practical action 
makes developing the academy rather more difficult than it would be if 
the enthusiasm were less.' Granted, Tanzania like any other state, is 
not organized primarily to facilitate social science research - officials 
and managers are busy people and cooperating in research takes scarce 
time. Detailed research projects affect as well as observe reality and 
not always very helpfully - when 56 research teams want to study one 
small village, either one needs to cut back to 1 or to add a 57th to
study the impact of the other 56 on rural development and social 
formation] Finally, like any state, Tanzania, especially in 
operational and applied roles, prefers social scientists it perceives 
as broadly sympathetic to its Party's goals. That is a fact of life 
anywhere social scientists are taken seriously - if knowledge is 
power and the academic has the power to alter reality, he can hardly 
expect to be sought out to amass power and to alter reality by 
decision takers and managers whose goals he rejects. Engage them 
directly or indirectly in discourse or mobilise groups who can get 
a hearing, yes; but advise those he wishes to remove, no.
The difficulty of proposing remedies is that it is very easy to
give the impression first that there are universal, total solutions to 
be had and that the author has discovered them. That is very rarely 
the case - indeed the quest for the universal, total, permanent solution 
is quite often part of the .problem, not the answer.
Several points need to be made on limitations:
a. some of the issues integral to the social sciences, par­
ticularly in their relationships with development and 
planning, are both complex and changing, so that to claim 
either to see the whole problem (let alone answer) or to 
see how it will appear in a decade (let alone in a century) 
is to demonstrate a fatal misunderstanding of reality;
b. other issues involve inherent tensions (at times hardening 
into antagonistic contradictions) - state and critic, 
thinker and administrator, commitment to goals and commit­
ment to objectivity, relative importance of different 
aspects of reality and relative value of different vantage 
points for locking at it. Resolving these tensions by
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enforcing uniformity is hardly plausible social science 
methodology (as well as hardly practicable), and there 
are rather few general guidlines as to when and how tensions
can be creative and no ultimate guide beyond conscience
as to when the proper response to a situation or a regime 
is to seek to change it by whatever means are necessary 
rather than to attempt to alter it by dialogue or semi- 
detatched advice and participation;
c. many problems and possibilities are almost totally
context-determined and nearly all are context-affected so 
that general pronouncements or guidelines miss some totally 
and are, at most, first approximations as to how others 
might be tackled.
The following tentative suggestions are limited to what social scientists 
of the academy might do themselves or jointly with inhabitants of plazas
and corridors. Certainly suggestions on the initiatives the other groups
might take can be written, but the presumptive audience for this paper 
is either academicians or rather intellectual managers and political 
takers who are interested in joint academy-corridor action.
Notes Toward An Academic Agenda
1. Applied research topics are a logical part of an academic agenda, 
especially when gaps in concepts and analysis limit the effective­
ness of the disciplines. Some priorities would appear to be:
a. the operational nature and dynamics of states;
b. the operational nature, goals and dynamics of burea- 
cracies and organisations (theory there is, but usually 
evidently too "pure," too partial, or too overtly 
manipulative);
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c. the possible meanings, requirements and patterns of 
mobilisation and participation (both of which suffer 
from being such "good” code words as to be used to 
cover a remarkably divergent variety of sins and good 
works);
d. coherent, functional definitions of planning at dif­
ferent levels and in different contexts;
e. serious consideration of the interaction of techniques 
and goals with respect both to ends and means relation­
ships and to contextual "objective" conditions;
f. "deconomysticism" - preferably not by creating alter­
native "mysticism" which, whatever their merits as 
worldviews, are almost certainly inherently inconsistent 
with planning;
g. more careful and detailed examination of interactions 
between the universal and the provincial (contextual), 
both in bread intellectual terms and narrower applied 
contexts, and examination from a variety of vantage 
points, not just from the centre or an artificial 
"universal" vantage point.
2. Communication also requires sustained attantion. 'The truth will 
not make anybody free if he is unable to find it or if it is 
presented in terms he cannot comprehend - or, worse yet, can 
easily comprehend wrongly.
a. The requirements (in content, technique, style) of 
potential users should be studied and taken more 
seriously. This includes different "levels" of
managers and. mobilizers, emphatically not just the 
highly educated, intellectual managers and political 
decision takers who can be seen as extensions of 
the academy.
Comprehensibility - defined in terms of the intended 
audience, which itself needs to be determined for 
particular pieces of work - must receive higher priority 
if social science work is to have broader impact. 
Technical terms are sometimes essential - special 
languages (usually unintelligible or misleadingly 
intelligible even to other disciplines) are undersir- 
able in principle and quite unsuitable for communica­
tions beyond the limited clans who speak them regularly. 
This is not a plea for writing down to mobiiisers, 
managers or decision takers - that is always counter­
productive. It is a plea for using terms and thought 
patterns they can comprehend - development administra­
tion was a discipline notable for its unique philology 
at times somewhat uncharitably dubbed neo-Syracusan.
The volume of material communicated to recipients must 
be plausible. Too much is as bad as too little (indeed 
it is a standard organizational technique to send so 
much information to supposed supervisors or decision 
takers as to guarantee that none is read with any care''. 
This implies "targeting" and rather complex distribu­
tion lists (albeit it saves paper and postage), but 
certainly can increase the actual readership and the
care paid to particular pieces.
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a. Similarly, it is desirable to have a brief introduction 
on materials sent to managers-mobilisers-decision takers 
indicating -why it is supposed that they will find it of 
interest. This is helped if the material is organized 
in a way which lends itself to problem analysis and 
solving, i.e., if it is not assumed that the academic 
journal format is necessarily the best all purpose com­
munication sytle.
3. Responsiveness to known needs of decision takers, mobilizers,
officials (and finding out what they are) is an important condi­
tion for effective cooperation, discourse, communication. 
Examples include:
a. ordering"research programmes to provide inputs into 
programme and policy preparation and evaluation;
b. making available interim research findings when the 
timing of the final report would limit its usefulness 
to decision takers, managers, mobilizers;
c. arranging research programmes to avoid overloading 
particular institutions and projects and taking into 
account the scarcity of senior personnel's time to 
be interviewed, provide data, make arrangements;
d. serving on mixed (official/unofficial) projects, 
committees and being open to arranging secondments of 
academic personnel to operational institutions and 
vice versa (in the latter case for teaching, research 
and/or study);
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e. preparing action-oriented reviews of policies, programmes, 
strategies directed to decision takers, managers - a 
a type of general consultancy report which can usually 
he done best by an individual at some remove from the 
areas analyzed but in a close enough proximity 
(physical, emotional, intellectual) to them to 
to have immediacy and contextual congruity. Such 
studied are very rarely done by citizen academicians 
and the work done by volunteer or, more commonly, 
hired expatriates is rarely very satisfactory since 
it usually is based on relatively brief contact 
and is distinctly out of focus as proposals for action 
even when the analysis is sound.
U. More care in looking at the academies' attitudes toward plazas 
and corridors and how these attitudes appear from outsiders' vantage 
points could reduce frictions based on misunderstandings or thought­
lessness, albeit it might increase them if the particular academicians 
and officials/politicians do hold imcompatible value positions. Examples 
include:
a. showing genuine respect for other actors, including 
seeking to understand what they view* as the
set of constraints and imperatives within which 
they operate;
b. making criticisms not intended as root and branch 
rejections specific and, when practicable, oriented to 
suggesting what the author sees as preferable alternatives;
c. when advising, formally or implicitly, concentrating not 
on what cannot be done or ways in which something cannot 
be done but on what is possible or what means/instruments 
are usable;
d. when seriously seeking to block or reverse a specific 
decision or policy to argue in terms of preferable alter­
natives rather than simple negatives;
e. avoiding claiming direct applicability for work which in 
fact requires substantial additional data and ways/means 
of articulation before it could reasonably be applied.
The last three suggestions may seem self evident - the author
can only say his observations indicate they are very often in the
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breach.
5. North-South interactions are by no means wholly separate from 
the previous "academic agenda" items. Each of these applies to 
expatriate personnel and institutions at least as much as to 
citizen ones. Indeed, in most cases they apply more strongly 
because both a natural caution in respect to the unknown or 
partially known and frequent unsatisfactory past experiences 
lead to special reservations by plaza and cooridor (and for that 
matter academy) in respect of expatriate social scientists. 
However, some points are more specific to this area:
a. the need for expatriate institutions and individuals to 
be and be seen to be seeking to cooperate as equal or 
secondary, not dominant, partners in intellectual effort 
largely focused, staffed and organized by citizens;
b. where that is still not possible (e.g. , because of lack
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of personnel or facilities make creation of the 
conditions under which it will he possible priority 
goals;
c. recognize that a combination of instant knowledge, 
substantial misunderstanding, claims to infalibility, 
and wholesale criticism are not well received by 
anybody, anywhere and that such combinations in the 
person of some expatriate social scientist create 
attitudes of mind toward all (or at least all unknown) 
expatriate social scientists;
d. pay special attention to what support can be given and 
would be welcome in building up greater South-South 
knowledge, contact, and interchange and how such support 
can be made an interim or launching programme rather 
than an~ongoing element which will rapidly come to be 
viewed as domination no matter hew well it may be intended.
Some Joint Action Notes
Effective interaction among academies, plazas and corridors requires 
mutual participation in planning of teaching/communication, research and 
operational activities. This is particularly true in respect to development 
in general and planning in particular. Academics are not always very quick 
to grasp this point, with the, result that even institutions and states 
genuinely concerned with intellectual contributions (not merely narrowly 
technical training or "learned apologia”) often feel driven to set up 
special research, training and consultancy units because they feel coopera­
ron and understanding cannot be secured from the traditional academies, 
ihis is not to say that specialist government quasi-academic institutes 
-o nco have a variety of roles to play, but that their creation in
response to frustration at relations with the academies is a most un­
fortunate starting point.
1. Teaching and communication need to he geared to user needs. Users 
are able to perceive at least some aspects of some of their needs 
better than outsiders. They are also more likely to be able 
to identify areas of emphasis and specialization - the standard 
academic teaching programme has distressing tendencies toward 
generalization and abstraction from the needs of any particular 
vocation or application rather too glibly justified in terms 
of "breadth of background" or "gaining the ability to cope with 
ideas.” Beyond pre-service training, including normal under­
graduate and postgraduate courses, there are usually needs for 
specialist courses in techniques or problem areas and for 
general refresher courses (especially given the recent breakup 
of the conventional wisdom on development!). These are very 
context-defined and can hardly be mounted by the academy in 
abstraction from users. On the other hand, in respect to 
refreshing and updating and to familiarity with new techniques, 
the academies are usually in a position to offer a good deal 
not available to "in-house" programmes by government bodies or 
enterprises. Finally, education in the broader sense of com­
munication - e.g., adult education classes, open lectures, 
newspaper and radio pieces - should be of concern to academics, 
but requires expert advice from outside the academy if the 
standard errors of talking down to audiences or talking at a 
level and in a vocabulary which are unintelligible to most 
of the potential audiences are to be limited.
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2. Research collaboration can be fruitful for both academicians 
and other actors. The gain for the academic researcher is not 
primarily finance (although that is often a not inconsiderable 
point) but access to data, contexts, insites, processes and 
people simply not available to the "pure outsider." (Evidently 
questions of confidentiality and use of such access arise, but 
usually what is actually seen as secret is narrower than might 
be supposed - time, habit and a dislike for the presence of 
"outsiders" often have more to do with access limitations than 
any serious view that the data or experiences are themselves 
confidential.) To continue collaboration must be seen as 
mutually beneficial and be articulated through appropriate 
modalities. Literally contracting out bits of research to the 
academies is one-but probably not the most fruitful or 
effective. Joint appointments, cross secondment of personnel, 
mixed research teams drawn from government/enterprise/party 
and academy are perhaps harder to organize but more likely to 
be productive of the gains available from interaction. They 
are usually most feasible in respect to governmental research 
units (e.g., in Treasuries, Planning Ministries and Central 
Banks) which at their best do have many of,the characteristics 
of academies, are to a substantial extent staffed by social 
scientists (admittedly heavily biased toward economists and 
political economists), and have a real concern with quality 
of thought and analysis and the opinion of academic social 
scientists.
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3. Operational activities evidently overlap research - researching 
and writing the rural water sector chapter of a Plan can he 
seen as a research project but is basically an operational 
activity - at least from the point of view of the would be 
user! Economic advising is primarily an operational activity 
but certainly provides a wealth of information and insights for 
later academic teaching and research use. Again the possibilities 
of team and cross secondment approaches need wider exploration 
than they have recieved, particularly in respect to citizens in 
Africa where they are common for expatriate academicians but not 
for domestic ones. Even more than in respect to research and 
teaching, joint action in this area should start with an explora­
tion of each actor's attitudes and expectations. Academic social 
scientists who suppose that their role will be that of Platonic 
Guardians discoursing learnedly on abstruse theoretical lines 
or making major decisions every hour are in for unpleasant shocks; 
so are politicians or bureaucrats who view academicians as sources 
of instant answers to all technical questions cum high level 
public relations experts (or "praise singers"). While miscon­
ceptions may not usually be quite this extreme they are common 
and can better be explored and resolved before than during 
participation in operational work.
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Envoi
In writing proposals for changes or pressing ahead there are two 
danmers. The first can be termed the "Edward Bear Syndrome." (with 
aoologies to A.A. Milne):
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Here is Edward Bear, coming down the stairs now, bump, bump, bumn, 
On the back of his head,
It is, as far as he knows, the only way of coming downstairs 
But sometimes he feels there really is another way,
If only he could stop bumping for a moment and think of it.
The second is the tendency to suppose either that an academician's 
duty is limited to proposing or marking beginnings or that any beginning 
not crowned with success in the short run is a failure. The prayer of 
Sir Francis Drake may still be apposite for social scientists concerned 
with planning:
Oh Lord, when thou givest to they servants to undertake 
any great matter, grant us also to know that it is not the 
beginning but the continuing of the same until it be well and 
thoroughly finished that yieldeth the true glory.
NOTES
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Reginald Kerbold Green is a Professorial Fellow at the Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Sussex, but wrote this paner 
while on sabbatical leave to the Ministries of Finance and of Planning 
of Tanzania. He has served on the "corridors" side of planning at various 
tines over 196H-80 in Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Namibia, the East African 
Community, Southern Africa Development Coordination and-more fleetingly- 
various international organizations, Swaziland, Botswana and Sri Lanka.
His "academy" interests have been pursued in fifty countries but 
primarily, Ghana, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Tanzania.
Further, it is in part 20-20 hindsight. While somewhat uneasy with 
the paradigm, the author did not start writing heresy until the mid- 
1 9 6 0s nor break fully until 19 7 0 at the time of the launching (and 
immediate sinking) of the Pearson Report.
In many cases one suspects that aid agencies, donor governments, academic 
advisors and host country decision takers have very different definitions 
of "good," few of which are based on any very serious inquiry into what 
the "beneficiaries" or "victims" of the process - beyond a handfull of 
the most vocal and powerful - ac ually desire.
The author is evidently biased, first because of his association with 
several of these efforts (well before they became fashionable) and, 
second, because he is distinctly out of sympathy with the way certain 
of them have been co-opted to use the connotations of a title and body 
of thought for purposes directly contrary to their initial thrust and 
implications.
This is rather different from saying his home is there or that his 
current position is there. Many Third World academicians and yet more 
expatriate visiting ones do not see the world from their own locations. 
Equally, there are cases - e.g.,the author - who are open to the descrip­
tion (or criticism) as seeing the world from the vantage point of a small, 
"least developed" state, even thought they are not citizens of such states 
nor necessarily resident in them.
How individuals or institutions become exceptions is not very clear. 
Relevance and intelligibility are frequent, but hardly universal, 
characteristics, and a certain informed rudeness combined with sweeping 
assertions of greater knowledge seems somewhat more typical than urbane 
politeness and more cautious or subtle advice.
Other angles of attack are possible: inter-subclass is one and elite,
including academy-plaza-corridors vs. excluded another. These, however, 
lead into interesting but lengthy digressions from the main themes of 
this paper.
'This is not an endorsement of "whatever is is right" as the motto for 
social scientists seeking to enter plazas and corridors. It is to 
suggest certain inherent reasons why root and branch critics can hardly 
exoect to be welcome participants in designing and implementing govern­
ment orogrammes and why political decision takers would, in fact, be ill 
advised to use them in such roles.
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9 . In part the author’s perceptions on this point may be biased by his 
personal experience of access and cooperation, including in countries 
for whose governments he had not worked. Indeed in some cases would 
certainly have refused to work. However, it is also based on broader 
observation from the corridor side in Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda.
10. However, corridor involvement of social scientists in India and Latin 
America would appear to show the same biases and patterns as in Africa 
and Southeast Asia. On the other hand the International Center for
Law in Development and the World Council of Churches are not necessarily 
very representative of disciplinary trends and stances in law and theology.'
11. Outside socialist Europe very little of the framework of planning (as 
opposed to say budgeting or external trade or currency) has been enacted 
as law. This appears to be almost as true of 'transition to socialism" 
as to other polities. Bureaucratic structures and regulations certainly 
do exist, but even administrative law is moderately ion common especially 
as an integral skeleton for or working organ of the planning process.
12. That is a descriptive statement not necessarily and advocacy of such a 
result in any particular case especially in respect to incorporation 
of work into the political decision takers' support system.'
13. In generad., social scientists tend to be self-indulgent in making clear 
from what value premises they criticize and what persons, classes, insti­
tutions they believe to hold the value-set on the basis of which the 
criticism is made. There is nothing whatsoever wrong with a critique 
based on an author's -values, but there are ethical and practical reasons 
why both the nature of the critique and the values underlying it should 
be made clear to the reader.
lb. These dilemmas confront citizens rather differently from expatriates.
The latter are more prone to accepting assignments for which they have 
no expertise (e.g., the author was once pressured to fly away to North 
Yemen to write a pre-plan and almost agreed) but more able to disagree 
with decision takers with the fallback option of (literally) flying 
away. Citizens are less likely to be seduced into assertions of 
global expertise, but face far more severe practical and ethical 
problems in making decisions when their disagreements with dominant 
decision takers are fundamental.
15. As the author knows both from observation and from having made precisely 
this mistake on several occasions himself.
16. They are not unique to the academy - bureaucrats have similar weaknesses - 
but they are perhaps most common among social scientists, including 
quite distinguished members of the professor with decades of advisoria 
experience. The first two habits infuriate decision takers (for whom
not doing anything very often is simply not a viable option), while the 
last (claiming direct applicability far too soon) is a cause of major 
conflict with officials and managers, especially if the social scien­
tist in question convinces political decision takers that his approach 
is sound and all that prevents its amclicaticn and success is mindless 
cificial intertia (not an unknown phenomenon but one less common than 
many academy members believe it to be.').
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17. As is presumably apparent to the reader, the forgoing observations, 
analyses, comments and suggestions are the personal responsibility 
of the author and are not necessarily those of the Treasury or the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning of Tanzania, 
nor, for that matter, of the Overseas Development Administration 
of the United Kingdom).
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